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In recent years, from the new base camp of literary theory, forays
have been made across disciplinary borders. These forays are in the
cause of intertextuality and the right to situate texts (as they say) in
unusual ways. Creative artists cross borders: Art galleries contain
'installations' that mix plastic and visual forms with language; a
biography of Dickens includes fancied dialogues in the life of the
writer; 1 there are factions in books and on film. The very idea of
borders is under challenge. The conviction that works belong to
disciplines, distinct practices or distinct traditions, is past its time.
We are to be disabused of differences or make them trivial by finding
so many 'contexts' for reading a text that the idea of a right reading,
grounded authoritatively in criteria bound up with a discipline or
tradition, will disappear from the intellectual landscape. A top Nazi,
Hcrman Goering, is said to have remarked about 'culturc', that when
he heard the word he reached for his revolver. When I hear the word
'context', I want to reach for some less violent weapon. Let it be a
remindcr of what, not too long ago, was standard fare in undergraduatc
humanities courses. It seems to me that fare contained nearly all
that is legitimate in currently fashionable vicws about how to read
critically.
First, considcr the distinction between fact and value, one of the
longcst established bordcrs in intellectual life. It was attacked some
time ago by a leading figure in literary thcory, Terry Eagleton.2
Eagleton downgrades the distinction on the grounds that when anybody
writes anything, there will be values lying behind the decision to say
this rathcr than that and an assumed authority to be listened to on the
matter, which is a kind of value judgment. This is a confusion between
the point of saying something and what is said.
Yalue judgments proper contrast (not much) with the implicit
making of them by writers of fiction, history, science, and everything
else, when they determine what to say and what not to say, what to
ask and what not to ask. This homily was drilled into me as an
undergraduate, along with everybody else who studied anything
123
The Sydney Society ofLiterature and Aesthetics
seriously. Along with that went the lesson that when you read
something critically, you should attend (within limits of course) to
what has not been said as well as to what has been said. I gather thcse
homilies of attentive and critical reading now get called somcthing
like deconstruction. 'This reminds mc of garbage collectors in the US,
who are called sanitation engineers. Of course, whcther the fact that
something had been lcft out was important was a matter of judgment;
and the idea that leaving it out was due to some quasi-conspiratorial
entcrprise on thc part of the author or his subconscious was not
something you took for granted. There probably are good reasons for
attending to this rather than that. For that matter, minimal reflection
shows there must be, for not everything is rclevant to everything.
There seems to be another aspect of deconstruction which also reminds
me of what I was taught by my philosophy teachers. It is that a
philosopher may very well nced, for coherence in part of what he
says, assumptions that he explicitly or implicitly denies elsewhere. I
am not sure if this is exactly a deconstructive idea; but it sounds a bit
like one, especially the famous example of Plato's using the mctaphor
of writing in the soul in the course of himself arguing that speech is
to be preferred to writing. I confess to bewilderment as to why this is
taken as so important. A much bettcr lu quoque is to ask Descartes
why, if he can doubt everything, he doesn't doubt whethcr he knows
thc meaning of the words 'doubt' and 'cverything'.
We are also regaled often of late with the thought that even if
there arc virtually undisputed facts, what is of interest is the
interpretation or the explanation of them, and, further, that any number
of interpretations or explanations may fit the facts. There is much to
be said for this idea. It is associated in the philosophy of science with
Pierre Duhem in our century. But it traces at least to the thirtcenth-
century's Nicholas of Cusa, who pointed out that in statcments of the
form: If P then Q, where Q is a fact we want to explain and P is a
proffered explanation, therc will always be a variety of Ps from
which Q follows. The point can be illustrated by letting P be 'God
wills that Q'. That gives us 'If God wills that Q, then Q', which, if
true (assuming God exists) would certainly explain Q. 'This would
not be, to most of us (theists included), a satisfactory explanation.
But the point is only that 'God wills that Q' does entail or explain Q,
for any Qwhatsoever. A more realistic case is, of course, the observed
planetary motions being susceptible of explanation either in the
Ptolemaic or in the Copernican way.
And the most prevalent contemporary case of more than one
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explanation for a cluster of data is the unending debate about nature
v. nurture as the reason for differences in various dimensions among
men and women, or, for that matter, people in general.
This allows that in any given case, the competition among Ps may
be intense; but it also allows that it may not be much of a competition
at all. There can always be cases in which the support for some P is
so overwhelming, the arguments in favour of P so convincing, that P
becomes the only game in town. This is how things have fallen out
with the heliocentric as opposed to the earth-centred story of the
(relevant part of) the heavens. This remains so even if, as hardly
anyone denies these days, later developments may cast doubt on even
this P, or any other. This modest fallibilism, as it is called, is nowadays
the consensus position. It is sanguine in the face of the threat of
scepticism. It says to the sceptic's nagging 'So, it is possible this is
not the explanation.', 'Yes, it's possible; but that does not mean there
is any reason to think so.' The mere possibility of being wrong, all by
itself, is not much of a shaker of confidence.
I want now to consider border crossing between literature and
philosophy. More effort lately has been expended, I think, assimilating
philosophy to literature than the other way round. There is a strong
push to encourage us to read philosophy as a species of rhetoric, to
attend to the style of philosophical writers, hound down their metaphors
and similes, etc. However, with Martha Nussbaum,3 we have a thinker,
clearly competent-even brilliant-in both philosophy and literary
criticism who has more to say about assimilating a good deal of
literature-mainly Greek drama and the novel-to philosophy, in
particular to moral philosophy, than about assimilating philosophy to
literature.
Nussbaum's philosophical hero is Aristotle, especially in his ethical
texts; and she concedes that Aristotle is not widely recognised as a
literary giant. So she has reason to incorporate literature into
philosophy rather than the other way round. The Nichomachean Ethics,
along with the rest of Aristotle's corpus, is relentlessly philosophical;
it is hard to imagine a great work in philosophy that is more so.
Perhaps Russell's Principia Mathematica would be a case. The contrast
with Plato is notorious, that philosopher having written works that
belong both to literature and to philosophy. This alone will make it
difficult, I think impossible, to resist the legitimacy and depth of the
distinction between the two enterprises. About Plato, as philosopher,
and about Aristotle, we are still concerned with the question: Who, if
either of them did, got it right? about ethics and much else. But the
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power and literary value of, say, Euripides' Hecuba, with its theme of
affliction undcnnining virtue, simply does not depend on whether
Euripides was-as he may well have been-cocking a snoot at Plato's
famous thought that nothing in the world can affect a good person so
as to make that person vicious. The power of affliction to tum a good
person into a vicious one, a theme informing Euripides' work does
not have to be a view or a position or a theory that you agree with for
that work to be appreciated. The 'opposite' themes of virtue triumphant
in the face of cruel adversity, or vice transformed to virtue through
loving justice and kindness, may not inform as many great works, if
they inform any convincing ones; but if it did, we would not treat the
authors as holding contrary views (they might not); moreover, we
would not expect critics to take stands and argue on the issue. But
when philosophers discuss the ethics of Plato and Aristotle, this is
one of the main things they do have to take positions on, present
arguments for, etc. They will be occupied with the question whether
Plato or his greatest pupil got it right. That is what makes it philosophy.
That is what makes it different from literature. Nothing is implied as
to which discipline or tradition is the more important one.
Literary works, especially the Greek tragic dramas and many
novels of the last two centuries, have themes which are plainly
recognisable as issues that get taken up in philosophical texts. The
teaching of ethics can be improved by using more than philosophical
works. Nussbaum, however, is maintaining more than the banality
that moral philosophers would do well to use literary works in their
ethics classes. Even so, this advice is not so banal as it sounds; I
recall Richard Hare exploding with anger during a seminar in Oxford
at the suggestion that he should, as a test of his ethical theory, sec if it
would illuminate the novels of Iris Murdoch. But that was long ago
and in another country, though the wench is still writing novels.
Nussbaum maintains that some literature is an integral part of
moral philosophy and ought to be recognised as such. She is quite
aware that there is a stronger claim being made than the minimal one
that there are good examples of moral conflict and moral dilemma in
literary works which will prove useful in ethics courses. To see what
she means, before doubting its plausibility, I need to say a bit about
how Nussbaum thinks of moral philosophy. For there are some
conceptions of the subject which suit her thesis better than do others.
It ought not to surprise anyone that philosophers do not agree about
what the branch of philosophy called ethics or moral philosophy is
supposed to accomplish.
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The first position to notice is that of Iris Murdoch,4 in her
philosophical work. She holds that teaching and studying ethics ought
to contribute to making us better people. This was, and in some
circles still is, a shocking position, confusing teaching with preaching.
In most work in ethics, the idea of the meta-ethical is in the forefront,
and it is contrasted with ethical theorising designed to establish and
articulate normative principles. Even the latter enterprise does not
see itself as immediately engaged with trying to make the students in
the class better people at the end of the semester. Normative ethical
philosophising is highly theoretical, striving to reconcile a mass of
intuitions about ethical matters with a package of general principles
of some kind. The recently developing area called Applied Ethics is
not plausibly seen as trying to improve the morals of our students.
Furthermore, it is controversial whether we want to train PhDs who
can help corporations to get around ethics when those corporations
already have lawyers to help them get around the law. I am not
myself enthusiastic about this new region in the teaching of
philosophy.
The methodology of many philosophers in ethics is one of pursuing
reflective equilibrium, which is a modem name-from John Rawls-
for Aristotle's practice of taking into account all the appearances and
saving as many of them as possible. The appearances are the intuitive
ethical judgments of anybody who cares to contribute to the enterprise
or intuitions of decent people generally. Some weighting is given to
the intuitions of experienced people whom we think to be particularly
good or virtuous. Aristotle said they had the what of ethical life, even
if not the why. Aristotle differed from Plato in that he did not think
the true nature of goodness had to be glimpsed in a realm of Forms;
he thought you would find it in the deeds and words of those among
your fellow citizens who were good men (there was some emphasis
on their being men, an emphasis which neo-Aristotelians assume is
not essential).
The metaphysical differences between Plato and Aristotle have
real consequences in relation to where and how we look for guidance
in working out how to live our lives. But Plato and Aristotle were
nevertheless both asking: 'How is it best to live our lives?'. They
were not, like the later great figure in the field, Kant, trying to show,
a priori, that the very notion of behaving ethically could be analysed
so as to demonstrate that it is irrational or incoherent to be bad. The
two Greek philosophers did think that it was irrational, in the sense of
not in your best interest, to be wicked; so they thought there was
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room for the question 'What is in it for me, this business of being
good and just?'. And they thought philosophy ought to answer that
question and also probably thought that only philosophy could answcr
it. What Nussbaum thinks is that ethics ought to be guided by that
concern. And I reckon that is what Murdoch thinks too.
So Murdoch's radical sounding position is not really so radical. It
is not yet preaching to inquire into whether the best sort of life for a
human being requires decency and justice as ingredients. It is not all
that far from preaching; but the sermons would be of a sort you will
not find much of in our time. Joseph Butler in the cighteenth Century
did give, as sermons, some of the best ethics ever written.5
The contribution, if any, of ethics to making us better is via bettcr
understanding of what virtue and justice are. Murdoch herself has a
remarkable view that moral virtue and intellectual virtue are just two
sides of one deep trait of character, which shows itself as disintcrested
concern to get things right in inquiry and what she calls the eye of
loving justice in practical life. Perhaps one will not find loving justice
accompanied by rampant ambition that pinches ideas from others,
desperately minimises the force of objections to pet theories,
suppresses data so as to promote one's students' prospects for jobs,
etc., etc. But there is a mass of anecdotal evidence for the claim that
such conduct exists among good scientists and researchers. A good
inquirer who is not a very good person is probably not merely not a
rarity; with many artists of major stature-perhaps even greatness-
the horridness of the life may sit beside the fineness of the work; and
I suspect this is not entirely accidental. That is what is really wrong
with Murdoch's position. At the very least, her thought has to be an
empirical one and she has just not assembled the evidence for and
against it, and analysed that evidence. Given that the life and the
work can conflict in lives less exposed to deep frustration and a sense
of failure than those of artists, I should find it surprising if investigation
revealed anything other than that many very good artists have been
vicious people. Simone Wcil was disposed to think in the way Murdoch
suggests; but she had a reservation on the matter; she said, as I have
quoted elsewhere: 'Every great artist, at least in his moments of finest
conception, shows himself to be an authentic lover of the good'. But
she followed that with a parenthesis: 'Possible exception, Rimbaud'.
Let me conclude with what I think is the best argument for the
impenetrability of the boundary betwecn literature and philosophy.
During thc Soviet regime in Russia, now 30 or more years ago (I am
not sure any more), two writers called Sinyavsky and Daniel were
128
Symposium: Lloyd Reinhardt
tried for slandering the Soviet State. One of them (I can no longer
recall which) was on the witness stand. He was interrogated concerning
a story in which he wrote about a period of 24 hours in which the
government abrogated the laws against murder. Characters in the
story went through various agonies deciding whether or not to take
advantage of the situation and go forth in pursuit of enemies or to
take cover and avoid them. The prosecutor extracted from his witness
that to write such a story was, in effect, to allow that it was possible
for things as depicted in the story to happen. Thus, argued the
prosecutor, the writer is asserting that it is possible for the Soviet
state to do such a thing, a clear slander on its integrity as a state.
Now the point is this. If a philosopher wrote about such a thing, he
would be presenting what is common in philosophy, a proof of a
possibility. A philosopher would precisely be interested in whether
such a thing was possible, whether it is or is not true that such
behaviour on the part of the government is possible. It is unlikely any
philosopher would ever be so specific, however; and would thereby
probably avoid prosecution. For it is much feebler to say that some
government somewhere might do such a thing than to say of the
current government that it might. The law against slandering or
insulting the state may strike us as a bad law, against all our liberal
traditions. But if there were such a law, it seems to me the philosopher
I have imagined would be guilty under it, while the writer of fiction
would not be. I am aware that there are philosophical theories which
view fictions as constructions of possible worlds. If that means that
fictions assert possibilities, then the story from Russia refutes such a
theory. And the border remains secure.
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